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«Like donkeys» so Tyrtaios described the Spartans’ unlucky enemies some-
time during the 7th century B.C. (but the Spartan warriors chanted these
very verses still in classical times1) «suffering under heavy yokes, by
painful force compelled to bring their masters half of all the produce that
the soil brought forth»2—but why? On what idea, on what political con-
cept and on what legal structures were these contributions based? The
most common answer—on Helotage—encounters two difficulties: the first
that it is not undisputed, and the second that it only names the phenom-
enon but does not really explain it.
We should start with the first of the two questions: Was it Helotage
that Tyrtaios knew and described, or did he think of some other, quite
different form of dependence? In fact he did not say that what he de-
scribed was or was called Helotage—he simply described what these
Messenian «donkeys» did. And thus the field may be thought open to
debate, as Nino Luraghi, following some very old ideas by Ulrich Karstedt,
recently pointed out3. Helotage—so he thinks—had nothing to do with
war, at least not directly, and it did not originate from the 7th century
1 Tyrtaios’ elegies belonged to the officially recognized canon of regularly
sung songs; cf.: Athen. 14.630 F.
2 Tyrt. fr. 5 D.
3 KAHRSTEDT U. Die spartanische Agrarwirtschaft // Hermes. 1919. Bd 54. S.
279–294; here: S. 290–294; LURAGHI N. Der Erdbebenaufstand und die
Entstehung der messenischen Identität // Gab es das griechische Wunder?
Griechenland zwischen dem Ende des 6. und der Mitte des 5. Jahrhunderts v.
Chr. Eds. D. Papenfuß ,  V.-M. Strocka. Mainz, 2001. S. 279–301; IDEM. Becom-
ing Messenian // JHS. 2002. Vol. 122. S. 45–69; IDEM. Helotic Slavery Recon-
sidered // Sparta. Beyond the Mirage. Ed. by A. Powell, S. Hodkinson. Swansea,
2002. P. 227–248. Cf. also some of the ideas which N. BIRGALIAS (Helotage
and Spartan Social Organization // Sparta. Beyond the Mirage. Ed. by A. Powell,
S. Hodkinson. London 2002. P. 249–266) recently forwarded.
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either. Rather, he says, it should be understood as the result of some 6th-
century economic development: Having seized the fertile plains of Messenia
the Spartans took the best parts of the land for themselves, leaving noth-
ing but the wretched rests for the Messenians. And then, he says, being
left with this unproductive soil only, the Messenians had to encounter a lot
quite similar to the one the Athenian small peasants had to face in the
times of Solon. The result, he thinks, was the same in both cases: an
enslavement of the agrarian debtors. As such a development, however,
should not be expected to come about at the very first moment after the
conquest of the land and the loss of the fertile plots, all this should be
thought to be a 6th-century development—thus leaving no room for Tyrtaios
to have known and sung about something like Helotage. And in fact the
forced labourers Tyrtaios knew, Luraghi thinks, cannot have been Helots
for two other reasons as well, one to be found in the writings of Aelian,
the other in those of Pausanias: As Aelian says that after the First Messenian
War the Spartans forced the Messenian «free women» to take part in their
masters’ funerary ceremonies, the Messenians cannot have been enslaved
by then—in this case the women would not have been free. And as
Pausanias, swallowing a pro-Messenian propaganda from the 4th or 3rd
century B.C., did not hesitate to cite Tyrtaios’ verses, he at least cannot
have identified Tyrtaios’ «donkeys» with classical Helots either: The pro-
Messenian propaganda, on the one hand, tried to show that Helotage was
a recent injustice. By citing Tyrtaios, on the other hand, this injustice
would have been proved to be an ancient one—if, what Tyrtaios described,
would really have been Helotage in its classical form. And as Pausanias
will not have made such a mistake (so Luraghi says), Tyrtaios’ «don-
keys» cannot have been any kind of slaves comparable to classical Helots
in any way.
Both these arguments, however, must fail. As to Aelian and his «free
(Messenian) women»: What Aelian tried to do was to tell a moving story,
nothing else. In order to make up such a story he in fact took recourse to
the material collected by Pausanias. But it is far from sure that he knew
anything more than what he found there. Even this argument alone is apt
to shake his reliability: As he simply cannot have found anything about
«free women» in Pausanias’ description, we have to suspect him of pure
invention right from the start. Moreover, he provably did not only invent
what he could not find; he also heavily distorted what he in fact found: As
he was not interested in handing down political or contractual details ac-
curately, but was interested in his moving story only, even such a straight-
forward stipulation as the one according to which the Messenians had to
bring to their masters ‘half of all the produce that the land brings forth’—
a stipulation he must have known from Pausanias’ quotation of Tyrtaios!—
degenerates into a robbing of ‘half of all the property found in Messenia’
in Aelian’s text. To base anything on his ‘free women’ seems simply
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arbitrary. There is no evidence in Aelian additional to that which Pausanias
employed.
And as to him: We should keep in mind, I think, that what Pausanias
wrote cannot simply be identified with 4th- and 3rd-century propaganda—
though he certainly made use of the material he found there. But, of course,
his interest was with the material only, not with the political argument. In
fact he found great delight in the heroic and colourful picture this propa-
ganda had drawn, but he did not take part in its political ambitions; he did
not argue. And as he did not argue, he did not have any reason whatso-
ever to avoid any information that was detrimental to the ends this propa-
ganda aimed at either. In other words: How does Luraghi want to know if
Pausanias found this quotation in the pro-Messenian propaganda? Why
shall he not have found it somewhere else and then made use of it? And
there is still another objection: Even supposed, he could and did find it
here: How does Luraghi want to know when this propaganda swallowed
Tyrtaios’ verses? Let us suppose that they were integrated into the image
which the Messenians promoted of themselves after the (wrong) suppo-
sition had arisen that Helots did not have to deliver half of their crops but
a fixed quantum4—would not Tyrtaios verses now perfectly fit in the
propaganda and its political aims (though describing exactly what archaic
and classical Helotage had been)?
There is still an additional argument we should not simply pass over:
the fact that Luraghi’s model—though it might possibly explain the helots’
deliverances for their masters—cannot explain the outstanding peculiari-
ties that made Helotage such a unique phenomenon, such a peculiar com-
munal kind of slavery: The prohibition to sell one’s own Helots5, the pro-
hibition of manumission6, the fact that the Helots’ rents were ultimately
fixed by the state7 and (above all) the annual declaration of war8—all these
peculiarities that should be explained historically remain unexplainable by
his ideas; not a single one of them is known from Solonian Athens, which
Luraghi chose to serve as a model. Simply to denote these peculiarities as
«distinctively Spartan» or as «functional to Spartan domination» will not
suffice if the goal is to explain what Helotage was.
So this argumentation cannot be counted to be convincing, neither in
general nor in detail. And thus we should at least reckon with the possibil-
ity that the Messenians Tyrtaios spoke about in fact were Helots (and that
4 For this cf.: S. HODKINSON. Sharecropping and Sparta’s economic exploita-
tion of the Helots // Philolakon. Studies in Honour of H. Catling. Ed. by J.M.
Sanders. London, 1992. P. 123–134; IDEM. Property and Wealth in Classical
Sparta. London, 2000. P. 125–131.
5 Ephor. FgrHist 70 F 117.
6 Ephor. Ibid.
7 Plut. Mor. 239 e.
8 Arist. Fr. 538 Rose (= Plut. Lyc. 27.7).
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the Spartan warriors, who chanted these verses in classical times, did not
sing about a remote history they can hardly have understood, but about a
contemporary reality they all knew)—an idea that would gain much per-
suasive power if we could show that Tyrtaios’ description in fact helps to
explain the peculiar structures or features of classical Helotage (or vice
versa).
These, the main structural features of classical Helotage, however,
are far from clear or self-explaining and consequently are highly disputed
in modern research. Some aspects are clear (as, e.g., the fact that Helotage
was a somehow peculiar form of slavery, the fact that the whole Spartan
citizenry lived on the Helots’ rents, or the fact that Helotage was espe-
cially degrading in character9), others are still most puzzling. For example
there are several hints to the fact that Helots were not counted to be the
private property of their owners, but common property of the state (as,
e.g., the prohibition of sale or manumission, or, to take another example,
the fact that at least some of the Spartan youths were regularly sent out to
kill helots regardless of any Spartan holder’s property rights). On the
other hand there are some very clear hints to the fact that they were not
thought to be common property at all: Xenophon, e.g., says that it was
every Spartiate’s right to make use of every other Spartiate’s horses or
dogs or Helots10—and as horses and dogs were surely privately owned he
clearly implies a private ownership of helots as well, tempered only by the
typical Spartan far-reaching camaradery11. And there is a similar confu-
sion about the question if a Helot was really a slave plain and simple—an
object, res, in legal terms—, or if he was a legal subject, persona (which
is to say, at the same time, that it is not clear if he was «owned» by
anyone at all or if he simply «belonged» to someone, if he was something
like a serf, belonging to some individual or to the community of the Spar-
tan citizenry as a whole). There are hints to both these ends: The fact,
e.g., that every Helot had to reckon with being murdered at any time
makes him look very much like an animal, like a res. On the other hand,
the fact that it was an underlying declaration of war that made all this
possible or the fact that there were contractual arrangements like the pro-
hibition of sale might be (and have been) taken to prove that Helots were
legal subjects.
Contradictory features like these have not only puzzled modern re-
search. Our ancient authorities already quite obviously had simply to guess
when they tried to explain what Helots were. Pausanias12—this is true—
9 See : DUCAT J. Le mépris des Hilotes // Annales. 1974. Vol. 29. P. 1451 sqq.
10 Xen. Lak. Pol. 6.3.
11 Cf. also the full-scale argumentation by HODKINSON. Property and Wealth. P.
113–116.
12 Paus. III.20.6.
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unreservedly took them to be public property and therefore simply called
them «slaves of the community». Strabo, however, was much more cau-
tious, calling them «public slaves, so to speak»13. And whereas Plutarch
took Helotage to be the most oppressive form of slavery14, Pollux assures
us that the Helots’ status was somewhere «between free and unfree»15.
Theopompos finally entangled himself completely in his effort to define
what Helots were: «The free people who are slaves», he wrote, «are called
Helots in Sparta»16. So, all in all, as certainty can be gained neither from
our ancient authorities’ descriptions nor from their definitions, modern
research was simply doomed to fail. More or less the end of this line of
research has been marked by Jean Ducat’s sigh from 1978: «Le statut des
hilotes», he wrote, «ne peut se définir en quelques mots, et toutes les
formules qui ont été présentées à cette fin sont insatisfaisantes par quelque
côté»17. Obviously we have to look for a new access.
The idea I would like to forward18 depends on an observation which was
made by Hans van Wees and published some years ago—an observation
that has nothing to do with Sparta in special or the Spartan Helotage as
such, but concerns a general Greek custom reflected by Homer19. As van
Wees pointed out the Homeric epos already knew the division of goods
and chattels into halves and deliverances of these halves—and it knew
these deliverances in a very specific context only: Handing over half of all
the movable property that was inside the walls of a town was a generally
accepted method for a city under attack to buy an attacker off and make
13 Strab. VIII.5.4.
14 Plut. Lyc. 28.11.
15 Poll. 3.83.
16 FGrHist 115 F 122 B.
17 DUCAT J. Aspects de l’hilotisme // AncSoc. 1978. Vol. 9. P. 5–46; here: 5; see
also: ALCOCK S.E. A simple case of exploitation? The helots of Messenia //
Money, Labour and Land. Approaches to the Economies of Ancient Greece.
Ed. by P. Cartledge, E.E. Cohen, L. Foxhall. London, 2002. P. 185–199, here:
189 sq.
18 See also: LINK S. Das frühe Sparta. Untersuchungen zur spartanischen Staats-
bildung im 7. un 6. Jahrhundert v. Chr. St. Katharinen, 2000. S. 45–58. The
idea has for the first time been hinted at (to the best of my knowledge) by
S INGOR H.W. Spartan land lots and helot rents // De agricultura. In memoriam
Pieter Willem de Neeve. Eds. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg et al. Amsterdam,
1993. P. 31–60; here: 43 sq.
19 VAN WEES H. Status Warriors. War, Violence and Society in Homer and
History. Amsterdam, 1992. P. 384 n. 47; see also: JACKSON A. War and raids
for booty in the world of Odysseus // War and Society in the Greek World.
Ed. by J. Rich and G. Shipley. L., 1993. P. 64–76; here: 67 (for the general
proliferation of this war custom in Homeric Greece).
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him leave. Hector e.g. once deliberated whether it might be sensible to
offer (in addition to kidnapped Helena) half of all the goods that were
inside the walls of Ilion to Achilles and the other Greeks, thus buying
them off—obviously quite a traditional way an army under attack could
take its resort to. (In fact it proved to be useless to Hector, but the reason
was only that Achilles—at least as it seemed to Hector—was not a usual
foe but an enemy who harboured a personal grudge against him)20. And
also the attackers in one of the pictures on Achilles’ new shield had this
war custom in mind: Some of them wanted to besiege the town until it
was captured, but some others wanted to be content with half of all the
goods that were within and then leave the town in peace21. «A standard
form of conditional surrender does exist», writes van Wees, «whereby
the city under attack may escape sacking by giving up half of its movable
wealth to the enemy».
This generally accepted Homeric war custom in mind, we can now
return to Tyrtaios and his «donkeys»—those people who were «suffering
under heavy yokes, by painful force compelled to bring their masters half
of all the produce that the soil brought forth». Now, I think, it is quite easy
to explain what wood their yokes were originally carved from: Even if
there was no other hint to this end, the fact that they had to deliver halves
in combination with the fact that (as far as I can see) deliverances of
halves in early Greece were known as a war custom only makes a very
strong point for the assumption that Tyrtaios’ «donkeys» in fact were the
unlucky victims of some Spartan military effort. But were they Helots as
well?
To answer this question we should have a closer look at the halves
the subdued Messenians had to deliver according to Tyrtaios. Although it
seems hardly debatable that these halves—deliverances that Tyrtaios prom-
ised to his soldiers in times of war!—must be taken to be a hint to the
underlying Homeric war custom, they cannot be said to be exactly the
same both in the epos and in Tyrtaios’ verses. There are two main differ-
ences. The first one: According to the Homeric war custom the people
under attack had to deliver one half of everything they owned at the very
moment. Not so in the case of Tyrtaios’ Messenians: As they had to hand
over half of all the soil brought forth, there must have been some continu-
ity in their payments. There must have been more stability in their exploi-
tation than in the cases of the besieged cities of the Homeric epos. And the
second difference: After having delivered half of everything from inside
the walls, i.e. after having paid the ransom, according to the Homeric war
custom the besieged people should (and usually would) be left in peace.
Not so in the case of Tyrtaios’ «donkeys»: As their deliverances obvi-
20 Il. XXII.111–128.
21 Il. XVIII.509–512.
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ously went on and on, they cannot have been left in peace by their offend-
ers. Obviously their attackers did not leave.
What we can deduce from these differences is that the Spartans
during their fights against the Messenians not only took over a war cus-
tom they knew from the Homeric epos (or maybe: ... that the Spartans
had ever since been practising a war custom which also found its way
into Homer’s descriptions of wars and raids), but that they also developed
this custom and made it fit the new needs and interests that must have
arisen after the conquest of Messenia: the interest to establish a stable
domination there. Compared to Homeric warfare (or «warfare», as these
wars were usually nothing but raids) this problem was quite a new one:
No Homeric hero ever tried to establish a permanent control in some
distant country, and thus the Homeric war customs had to be adapted to
fit the Spartans’ new problem. One of the steps they took was to replace
the deliverance of half of all the wealth—a deliverance that seemed ad-
equate to a raid, but inappropriate to a long-lasting political domination—
by the deliverance of half of all the crops; another one was not to let the
enemy free and in peace, though having received the ransom.
Especially this second step seems most offensive: How, you wonder,
could the Spartans simply violate the treaties that regularly were the basis
and marked the beginning of some such agreements between two oppos-
ing armies22?  There is, I think, only one way to explain how they man-
aged to avoid a breach of the contract and thus evade the gods’ wrath: the
invention (or the development) of the well-known declaration of war on
the Helots. Year by year, so we are told23, when the ephors assumed
office—i.e. in autumn24, after the end of the harvest, after the crops had
been halved and after the old liability had thus been wiped out—they de-
clared war on them, thereby creating a new situation of war that would
make the Helots buy their attackers off anew for the next twelve months
to come, though only for another declaration of war to be issued on them,
and so on. And though we do of course not know the exact wording of
this declaration, it is at least possible to make some assumption: Quite old
as it must have been we should expect it to parallel other declarations of
war from the archaic times. Two of them are known and pertinent: First
the declaration of war which Menelaus and Odysseus were said to have
made on the Trojans when reaching Ilion, and then the one Themistocles
issued when starting to besiege the town of Paros: «Having there disem-
barked and encamped», Herodotus tells us about the Greek arrival on the
22 See e.g.: Il. III.103–107.
23 Aristot. Fr. 538 Rose (= Plut. Lyc. 27.7).
24 BUSOLT G., SWOBODA H. Griechische Staatskunde II. München3,1926. S. 686
with n. 5.
25 Hdt. II.118 (ad Il. III.205–224).
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plain of Troy25, «they sent to Ilion messengers … These, on coming within
the city walls, demanded restitution of Helen and the possessions which
Alexandrus had stolen from Menelaus and carried off … But the Teucrians
then and ever afterwards declared, with oaths and without, that neither
Helen nor the goods claimed were with them … But the Greeks thought
that the Trojans mocked them, and therewith besieged the city, till they
took it.» Though not said expressis verbis, this «declaration of war» looks
very much like a demand for booty plain and simple—a character that
becomes even clearer in the second case: Having reached Paros,
Themistocles declared war on the city by sending a message according to
which the Parians should hand him over 100 talents; otherwise, he told
them, he would not lead his army away before having taken the town26.
To cut it short: An archaic «declaration of war» was nothing but a ritual-
ized extortion—and this is exactly what we would suppose the annual
Spartan declaration of war on the Helots to have been.
Having understood the system of exploitation and its historical roots,
we can return to our question and ask ourselves once again if the depend-
ency Tyrtaios described really was Helotage (or, maybe, an early kind of
it). The answer, I think, is now quite easy, because the parallels between
the living-conditions and legal traits of Tyrtaios’ «donkeys» and the clas-
sical Helots are more than close—in fact they are simply the same: As
«Helots»—i.e. as «prisoners of war»27—the classical Helots were forced
to deliver a fixed quota (as a ransom, as we now know). Just like Tyrtaios’
unlucky Messenians, however, they could never realistically hope for free-
dom and peace after having paid the ransom (because another declaration
of war would follow, as we now perceive). And above all: Just like Tyrtaios’
Messenians, who were constantly paying their attackers off with eternal
ransoms, also the classical Helots lived in a situation that can hardly be
described by legal terms: free—i.e. enemies—is what they were from the
one point of view, unfree—i.e. overpowered and enslaved enemies—what
they were from the other. They could be taken to be private property—
i.e. human booty, overpowered in war, enslaved and distributed among
the victorious warriors—, but just as soon you can take them to be a
public, a common good or rather a public enemy (as the basis of their
enslavement was nothing else but a public declaration of war the Spartan
state as a whole issued every year on the Helots as an equally enclosed
citizenry). And, moreover, all the restrictions the Spartan community as a
whole imposed on the single Spartan Helot-owner can be explained by
26 Hdt. VI.133.
27 For the etymology see LOTZE D. Metaxy eleutheron kai doulon. Studien zur
Rechtsstellung unfreier Landbevölkerungen in Griechenland bis zum 4. Jahr-
hundert v.Chr. Berlin, 1959. S. 26; DUCAT J. Les Hilotes. Athens, 1990. P. 10.
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these historical roots. Thus, e.g., it is a matter of course that no-one
could be allowed to extract higher deliverances from his Helots than 50%—
as the basis of Helotage was the war custom described above. Of course
no Spartiate could be allowed to manumit one of his Helots if the relation
between them was a relation of war—such a behaviour would simply
have been fraternization. An it goes without saying that no Spartiate could
be allowed to sell his Helots outside the country, if all the Helots together
formed the booty the Spartan state as a whole wanted to live from (and so
on). So, all in all we should not doubt that Tyrtaios’ pitiful «donkeys» in
fact were Helots.
Helotage—this is the result of my considerations—thus proves to be
a kind of slavery that had not been shaped by legal thinking about owner-
ship and possession or freedom and slavery (and thus can hardly be ex-
plained by applying these criteria). Helotage was quite a different thing.
Its invention—so it seems—was nothing but the institutionalization and
eternalization of a typical archaic situation of war (including some adaptions
in detail). Thus Helotage was shaped as the most heroic form of slavery
thinkable—that form that perceived the owner to be the victorious hero,
the slave to be his inferiour enemy, and the slave’s deliverances to be a
ransom he paid in acknowledging his opponent’s superiority.
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ÑÏÀÐÒÀÍÑÊÀß  ÈËÎÒÈß: ÕÀÐÀÊÒÅÐ  È  ÏÐÎÈÑÕÎÆÄÅÍÈÅ
Øòåôàí Ëèíê
Íåò ñåðüåçíûõ îñíîâàíèé äëÿ ñîìíåíèé â òîì, ÷òî ïðîèñõîæäåíèå èíñòè-
òóòà ñïàðòàíñêîé èëîòèè áûëî ñâÿçàíî ñ âîîðóæåííîé ýêñïàíñèåé Ñïàðòû
â îòíîøåíèè Ìåññåíèè â ïåðèîä I è II ìåññåíñêèõ âîéí. Ïîýòîìó ñòèõè
Òèðòåÿ, ñîãëàñíî êîòîðûì ïðîèãðàâøèå ìåññåíöû äîëæíû áûëè «âïðåäü
îòäàâàòü ïîëîâèíó òîãî, ÷òî ïðèíîñèëè ïîëÿ», ìîæíî ðàññìàòðèâàòü êàê
ïîýòè÷åñêîå îïèñàíèå ïîëîæåíèÿ èëîòîâ (èìåííî íà òàêîé ïîçèöèè è ñòîèò,
äåéñòâèòåëüíî, áîëüøèíñòâî ñîâðåìåííûõ èññëåäîâàòåëåé). Èñõîäíóþ
òî÷êó, ê êîòîðîé âîñõîäèò ýòîò ïîðÿäîê, ìû ìîæåì óñòàíîâèòü, îáðàòèâ-
øèñü ê âîåííûì òðàäèöèÿì, îïèñàííûì â ïîýìàõ Ãîìåðà. Ðå÷ü äîëæíà
èäòè, â ÷àñòíîñòè, îá îáû÷àå îòêóïà, ñ ïîìîùüþ êîòîðîãî îñàæäåííûé
ãîðîä ìîã ñïàñòèñü, ñîãëàñèâøèñü ïåðåäàòü ïîëîâèíó âñåãî ñâîåãî äâèæè-
ìîãî èìóùåñòâà. Ïðèñïîñàáëèâàÿ ýòó òðàäèöèþ ê íåîáõîäèìîñòè óñòàíîâ-
ëåíèÿ óñòîé÷èâîãî äîìèíèðîâàíèÿ â Ìåññåíèè, ñïàðòàíöû êàê ðàç è èçî-
áðåëè èëîòèþ—ôîðìó ðàáñòâà, êîòîðóþ íåâîçìîæíî îáúÿñíÿòü óäîâëåò-
âîðèòåëüíûì îáðàçîì (à, çíà÷èò, íåâîçìîæíî è ïðàâèëüíî ïîíÿòü), ïðè-
ìåíÿÿ ëèøü þðèäè÷åñêèå êðèòåðèè, êàê, íàïðèìåð, áèíàðíûå îïïîçèöèè
«ñâîáîäíûé»—«íåñâîáîäíûé» èëè «îáùåñòâåííàÿ ñîáñòâåííîñòü»—
«÷àñòíàÿ ñîáñòâåííîñòü». Áîëåå ïðàâèëüíî, âèäèìî, îáúÿñíÿòü èíñòèòóò
èëîòèè â òåðìèíàõ âîéíû: ñ îäíîé ñòîðîíû—ãåðîèçì è ïîáåäà, ñ äðóãîé—
ïîðàæåíèå è ïîä÷èíåíèå; â êà÷åñòâå ñîåäèíèòåëüíîé ñâÿçè ìåæäó ýòèìè
äâóìÿ ñòîðîíàìè âûñòóïàëà îáÿçàííîñòü ïîáåæäåííûõ ïëàòèòü âûêóï, à
îáû÷àé åæåãîäíîãî îáúÿâëåíèÿ âîéíû èëîòàì ïðè òàêîì óãëå çðåíèÿ
äîëæåí ðàññìàòðèâàòüñÿ êàê «þðèäè÷åñêîå» îñíîâàíèå äëÿ âñåãî ýòîãî.
